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Legal prohibition of some types of discriminatory conduct may be 
morally acceptable even though the conduct being prohibited would not 
be immoral in the absence of legal prohibition.  Consider Thomas Schelling’s 
analysis of patterns of racial segregation in residential housing.1  If one 
sees a sharply segregated housing segregation pattern (for example, 
African-Americans living next to African-Americans, whites living next 
 * Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of California, San Diego.  
Thanks to David Brink for helpful verbal comments on a first draft of this essay and to 
Andrew Koppelman for instructive written comments published in this Symposium.  
 1. Thomas C. Schelling, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 135-66 (1978). 




to whites, and African-Americans living next to whites only at the 
neighborhoods’ edges) even though there is no legal requirement that 
forces this result, one might suppose that what explains the segregation 
is a strong desire of almost all members of one or both groups not to live 
in proximity to any members of the other group.  Schelling presented a 
simple model of the dynamics of residential housing choice that showed 
that mild racial preferences could lead to strongly segregated outcomes.2  
For example, if nobody wants to live in a neighborhood in which members 
of his racial group are a minority, and individuals occasionally move in 
and out of neighborhoods, eventually a strongly segregated pattern 
emerges.3  In other words, segregation can emerge even if no one is 
averse to living in proximity to members of another race. 
Plausibly, the mild racial preferences that Schelling showed capable of 
inducing segregated housing patterns are morally innocent.  It is not 
merely the case that they are not seriously morally wrong or not viciously 
racist.  Arguably, they are not wrong at all. 
Nonetheless, the segregated housing patterns induced by a Schelling 
mechanism might be the cause of serious social harms.  To generate a 
simple example, imagine that children interact with other children who 
live nearby, that whites are wealthy and educated and African-Americans 
are poor and uneducated, and that interacting with children whose 
parents are wealthy and educated is a great boon if you are a child of 
poor and uneducated parents.  Also assume that contact with children 
whose parents are richer and more educated than yours increases your 
expected lifetime wealth and education prospects, and to a far greater 
degree than interacting with children whose parents are poorer and less 
educated diminishes your lifetime prospects.  Segregation in these imagined 
circumstances would do little, if anything, to help white children and 
would do a lot to hurt African-American children.  Specifically, segregation 
would deprive African-American children of an important educational 
resource.  In this setting, prevention of serious harm to African-
American children might constitute sufficient grounds for passing a fair 
housing act that forbids discrimination on the basis of race in the rental 
housing and home sales markets. 4
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. One might object to my description of the example by claiming that if housing 
residence choices based on mild racial preference generate great social harm in the 
aggregate even if the each individual choice looks to be morally permissible when 
assessed in isolation, then the choices, despite superficial appearances, are morally 
wrong.  They cause harm and, ex hypothesi, any gains they secure do not sufficiently 
counterbalance the harms to render the acts that produce these net effects morally 
permissible, all things considered. 
In some cases, each member of a set of acts may cause harm taken together, but be 
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Even if discriminatory choices about where to live cause aggregate 
harm, none of the acts need be morally wrong according to nonconsequentialist 
moral principles.5  The acts might exhibit no more than morally permitted 
partiality toward those near and dear to us and violate no individual’s 
moral rights. 
The Schelling analysis of residential housing segregation suggests the 
question, when an act of discrimination on the basis of race is morally 
wrong, what features of what is done determine that result?  More 
broadly, what is morally wrongful discrimination?  This essay seeks to 
answer this question. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Antidiscrimination norms single out particular categories of traits and 
forbid discrimination among persons in certain contexts on the basis of 
these traits.  Neither theory nor practice tell us much about the principle 
for selecting these categories, if such there be, and the justification for 
this principle, if any.  The principle of selection does not leap out and 
confront us when we inspect the particular categories of traits that are 
commonly agreed to be illegitimate determinants of choice.  The idea 
such that no individual act taken by itself is a but-for cause of harm.  Regarding some of 
these cases, I say a deontological theory that includes a duty of beneficence (“Do some 
good on some occasions!”) and a general duty not to cause harm in certain ways, even if 
the act that harms is not intrinsically wrong would allow that none of some sets of acts, 
each set causing significant harm, includes any individual morally wrong acts. 
In passing, I note that an act consequentialist should allow that some acts that are 
members of sets of acts that in the aggregate do significant harm are nonetheless acts that 
bring about an outcome no worse than the outcome any alternative choice of acts would 
have brought about instead, and hence morally right by this standard.  Suppose it is given 
that to do any good, one thousand individuals must converge in doing a certain type of 
act (cooperate), and it is given that whatever I do, the one thousand-act threshold will not 
be reached and the good will not be achieved.  Then some noncooperating act may well 
be the act that, in my actual circumstances, I morally ought to do, notwithstanding its 
being a member of a set of acts that together produces a very bad result, the loss of the 
good that could have been achieved had one thousand of us cooperated. 
 5. An act consequentialist principle holds that one ought morally always to do an 
act that brings about overall consequences no worse than those that would have been 
brought about by any other act one might have done instead.  See SHELLY KAGAN, THE 
LIMITS OF MORALITY (1989); Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Consequentialism, STAN. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., Feb. 9, 2006, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism.  
Conversely, a nonconsequentialist ethic is one that rejects consequentialism.  See 
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 28-33 (1974); F. M. Kamm, Non-
consequentialism, the Person as an End-in-Itself, and the Significance of Status, 21 PHIL. 
& PUB. AFF. 354 (1992). 




that it is wrong to discriminate on the basis of race, creed, or color 
commands wide assent.  The idea that it is wrong to discriminate on the 
basis of talent, virtue, citizenship, or friendship and family ties does not.  
Beyond that, the status of many classifications is uncertain, and the 
principle of selection looks elusive. 
Discrimination that is wrong in one context may be acceptable in 
another.  Inviting only old people to my sixtieth birthday party may be 
ill-advised, but would not be regarded as morally troubling in the way 
that refusing to extend an employment offer or university admission to 
an otherwise best-qualified applicant on the ground of old age is thought 
to be.  In broad terms, home ground for an antidiscrimination norm is a 
public sphere of activity as distinguished from a private sphere.  How to 
draw the relevant boundary line between public and private spheres for 
these purposes is not clear and is also contestable.  An analytic account 
of the nature of wrongful discrimination should be able to explain why 
antidiscrimination norms apply only in certain contexts, and ideally 
should provide a principle of demarcation.  On the other hand, the 
importance of this split between public and private should not be 
exaggerated.  If I refuse to date an African-American woman or to 
befriend a Chinese-American man solely on the ground that I regard 
only people who are white-skinned as meritorious candidates for 
personal friendship, surely these prejudiced refusals are morally wrong if 
discrimination on the basis of race or skin color is ever morally wrong.6
The exploration of this topic will proceed within a given moral 
framework.  This framework is assumed, and not even cursory attempts 
are made to defend it.  The framework is not idiosyncratic.7  Arguably, it 
is part of the plain common sense of contemporary culture.  At any rate, 
it is worth asking, what is the most sensible account of wrongful 
discrimination, given the framework?  The framework is a deontological 
morality that holds, contrary to act consequentialism, that what it is 
morally right and wrong8 to do is fixed by constraints and options.9  
There are moral constraints on conduct that restrict what it is permissible 
 6. The proposal about what makes discrimination wrongful that this essay 
endorses does not distinguish public and private discrimination.  Nor does it distinguish 
discrimination by the state or public officials from discrimination by nonstate agents. 
 7. For the record: The moral framework I assume in this essay is not the one I 
would ultimately endorse.  The project of this essay is to explore what one should hold 
about discrimination, given that one adheres to a deontological morality.  On the nature 
of deontology, see generally DEONTOLOGY (Stephen Darwall ed., 2003). 
 8. That is, what is permissible, impermissible, and required. 
 9. The terminology of “constraints” and “options” is explained in Kamm, supra 
note 5, at 354. 
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to do in pursuit of any of one’s goals.10  These moral constraints mainly 
take the form of moral rights of others that are correlative with moral 
obligations that one must not violate these rights.11  So long as one 
conforms one’s conduct to the moral constraints, one is not morally 
required to bring about the greatest good that one’s choice of act could 
achieve within these constraints.12  Thus, one has wide liberty to live 
one’s life as one chooses so long as one does not violate any moral 
constraints.  In the leeway that constraints leave open, one has options. 
Discrimination that is intrinsically morally wrong occurs when an 
agent treats a person identified as being of a certain type differently than 
she otherwise would have done because of unwarranted animus or 
prejudice against persons of that type.13  In other words, wrongful 
discrimination is a subcategory of defective discrimination.  One person 
may fail to respond to another in the right way given the circumstances, 
or respond by treating the other in ways that fail to adequately respond 
to the reasons that dictate how the other ought to treated, without the 
failure amounting to wrongful discrimination.  The extra bit that when 
added to generic defective discrimination constitutes wrongful discrimination 
is the fact that one is led to defective conduct toward the other by 
unjustified hostile attitudes toward people perceived to be of a certain 
kind or faulty beliefs about the characteristics of people of that type.14
 10. The locus classicus on moral constraints on morally acceptable conduct that 
apply independently of social convention is JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF 
GOVERNMENT (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1980) (1690), chapters I-II. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD 
WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST (on the intuitive oddity of a morality that 
denies moral options). 
 13. Here I want to record indebtedness to the exploration of the topic of wrongful 
discrimination in Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong?  
Biases, Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149 (1992). 
 14. An initial query: Why not specify that wrongful discrimination involves 
treating a person of a given type worse, rather than merely differently, than one 
otherwise would have done, had one not been motivated by animus or prejudice against 
persons of that type?  I submit one can be guilty of wrongful discrimination when one 
treats a person morally appropriately (so far as one’s behavior is concerned) and better 
than one would have done had one not been moved by negative attitudes or bias against 
the group of which one holds the person to be a member.  Consider this example: One 
treats a person better than one otherwise would have done from animus or prejudice 
against persons of that type.  One says to oneself, “I’d better pay what I owe to Sally, 
because she is a pushy Jew, or an uppity black, or whatever, and would respond more 
aggressively to not being paid than other persons of better type.” 




II.  THE ALLEGED IRRELEVANCE OF INTENTION, FAULT, AND 
MOTIVATION TO PERMISSIBILITY 
At the outset, a serious objection applies to this proposal.  The 
objection derives from work by Judith Thomson in clarifying the 
structure of a morality of moral constraints and moral options.15  
Thomson’s idea is that we should separate cleanly the issues (1) whether 
or not an action by some agent would be morally permissible; (2) 
whether the agent would be at fault if he were to do the action; and (3) 
with what intention the agent would do the act if he were to do it.16  
Issue (1) is claimed to be entirely independent of issues (2) and (3).17  
Whether going to the store and buying bread right now is permissible 
depends on the features of that act, and according to Thomson, the 
crucial point is whether my doing this right now would violate anyone’s 
moral rights (that are not overridden by counterbalancing factors).18  The 
act can be completely innocent even if the actor intends something bad 
in doing the act, or would be (culpably) at fault in doing it.  My hatred of 
Sally might induce me to repay a debt to her on time, because I know 
that she will be distressed that my right conduct in this instance, a rare 
phenomenon, deprives her of yet another opportunity to lament my 
failure to fulfill my obligations.  My intention is bad but the bad 
intention does not taint the act, which remains the morally required thing 
to do.  So, any proposal to characterize a type of wrong action in terms of 
the agent’s intention or the agent’s culpability of conduct is mixing up 
categories that for clarity’s sake had better be kept in separate bins. 
Thomson illustrates her thesis by considering examples in which the 
distinction between what the agent is actually doing, in the thin sense, 
and what the agent intends to be doing is clear and sharp.19  For 
example, assume I intend to kill my wife in circumstances in which she 
plainly has a right not to be killed.  I offer her what I take to be deadly 
poison and seek to persuade her to ingest it.  In fact, the stuff I am giving 
to her is the medicine that she must take if she is to survive some 
threatening lethal disease.  What I am doing is saving her life; what I 
intend to be doing is murdering her.  Clearly what I am actually doing is 
morally right, despite my evil intent.  I am morally at fault or culpable 
 15. See JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS (1990); Judith Jarvis 
Thomson, Physician-Assisted Suicide: Two Moral Arguments, 109 ETHICS 497 (1999); 
Judith Jarvis Thomson, Self-Defense, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283 (1991). 
 16. Thomson, Self-Defense, supra note 15, at 292-97. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 298-303. 
 19. Id. at 293-94. 
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here in doing what is actually the right thing.  The culpability arises from 
my evil intention. 
The Thomson position does not officially deny that the permissibility 
status of proposed acts is independent of the motivation that would lead 
the agent to do the act if he were to do it, but the considerations that 
drive a wedge between the assessment of the act and its fault on one side 
and the agent’s intention on the other would appear to press motivation 
on the fault and intention side of the divide.  I treat her position as 
striking down on these general grounds my proposed account of 
wrongful discrimination. 
I do not wish to deny that one may characterize an agent’s act in given 
circumstances in abstraction from the motive, intention, or fault that 
might attach to the agent’s doing of that action.  Call this the act thinly 
described.  For example, suppose that from spiteful malice I decline to 
share my large ice cream cone with my little brother, who strongly 
desires some licks.  My act can be thinly described without reference to 
the spiteful malice.  One can raise the question whether the act thinly 
described is morally permissible or not.  Let us suppose this question is 
settled in a deontological framework by inquiring whether any true thin 
description of an act characterizes it as a violation of someone’s moral 
right.  If the act fully described violates someone’s right, then it would 
be morally wrong for the agent to do it, unless all the agent’s alternatives 
would violate more weighty rights, or unless failing to violate the moral 
right on this occasion would bring about excessively great losses for 
other people (affected non-rightholders).  Here I am just assuming that a 
reasonable theory of moral rights and corresponding obligations can 
operate on acts thinly described and determine their moral status as 
permissible, forbidden, or required.  This assumption might be open to 
challenge, but that discussion would take us too far afield. 
Let us also grant the assumption that assessments of an agent’s 
intention in acting reflect on the quality of the agent’s exercise of agency 
in doing the act and maybe on the character of the agent, but not directly 
on the act itself (thinly described).  Likewise, whether an agent would be 
at fault or culpable if she were to do an act does not bear on the different 
question whether the act itself, again thinly described, is permissible, 
impermissible, or required. 
But all of this leaves open a further assessment of the act thinly 
described combined with the intention with which the agent acts.  And 
we can assess the package of the act thinly described combined with the 




features of the agent’s doing of it that render her at fault or culpable in 
the doing.  These combination assessments might issue in judgments 
to the effect that the combination is permissible, impermissible, or 
required.  Given the above, I see no reason to suppose that combining 
assessments is impossible or illegitimate.  Thus, such assessments will 
be made. 
There is a purely verbal issue, whether to say that an assessment of an 
agent’s motivation, intention, or fault in action counts as part of an 
assessment of the “action itself.”  The resolution of that issue depends on 
how one defines one’s terms.  If there is a substantive issue, it is whether 
or not it can be morally wrong to perform bodily movements that 
constitute an unobjectionable act thinly described, if it is also the case 
that if one were to perform those movements, one would be acting with 
morally objectionable intentions, motivations, or be engaged in a doing 
that is faulty when viewed from a perspective that encompasses more 
than thin description. 
Returning to the example of my refusal to share my ice cream cone, it 
might be the case that this act thinly described is morally permissible, 
doing it from spiteful malice is bad, and the combination of the act thinly 
described and doing it from spiteful malice is impermissible.  It is not 
wrong to decline to share your ice cream, but declining to share it for 
that reason is wrong.  These judgments do not conflict; they can be true 
together.  We could say the act I propose to do thinly described is 
permissible, but this leaves entirely open the further issue, whether the 
act thickly described is permissible.  Put another way, I suggest that 
what an agent proposes to do (thinly described) may not be wrong as 
such, yet it would be wrong to do the thinly described act with a certain 
intention, or from a certain motivation, or if one would be culpable if 
one were to do the act. 
Thomson tends to treat examples in which there are very strong 
reasons to do the act thinly described.20  Although it would be best to do 
the right thing for the right reason, if the thing is important enough it is 
likely better to do the right thing for the wrong reason than not to do it at 
all.  However, consider examples of acts that thinly described are merely 
permissible, not supported by a compelling weight of moral reasons.  
For such acts one might hold that it would be better not to do the act at 
all than to do the act with an evil intention or in a manner such that one’s 
performance of the act would render one culpable.  For example, it 
might be permissible to hire a white male rather than a more qualified 
Hispanic female for a job, there being no right of the most qualified 
applicant to be offered the position, but this permission evaporates if 
 20. Id. 
ARNESON_POST AUTHOR EDIT.DOC 2/26/2007  11:29:54 AM 
[VOL. 43:  775, 2006]  What Is Wrongful Discrimination? 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 783 
 
what I would be doing is passing over a qualified candidate from racial 
animus or misogyny. 
III. THIN DESCRIPTION ACCOUNTS OF WRONGFUL DISCRIMINATION 
Although the Thomson Irrelevance-of-Fault-and-Intention-(and Motivation) 
-to-Moral-Permissibility claims should probably be rejected, the 
considerations adduced against them do not amount to a decisive rebuttal.  
So it may be worthwhile to inquire how to conceive of wrongful 
discrimination on the assumption that what makes discrimination 
intrinsically wrong has to do with features which show up in the thin 
description of such acts. 
One possibility is that in contexts such as selection among applications 
for employment, bank loans, and university admission, the Lockean right 
in question is the right of the most qualified applicant to be selected first 
and offered the position in question, then the second best applicant if the 
applicant chosen first declines the offer, then the third best on the same 
terms, and so on down to the worst ranked applicant.21  What it is to be 
best qualified varies from context to context.  For example, the best 
qualified applicant for a university course of study is the one whose 
aptitude and background preparation plus the likelihood that she will 
work hard at it, taken together and appropriately weighted, render her 
reasonably expected level of success at that course of study higher than 
any other applicant’s level.  The best qualified applicant for a bank loan 
is the one to whom giving the loan increases the bank’s reasonably 
expected profits the most.  The best qualified applicant for employment 
is the one whose hiring would most advance the hiring enterprise’s 
morally innocent goals, appropriately weighted.22
A further qualification must be noted.  An applicant for employment, a 
bank loan, or a position as a university student participates in a 
procedure.  The procedure specifies a selection process.  An applicant 
can be best qualified and yet fail to be selected owing to various causes: 
(a) the procedure is ill designed; or (b) the procedure is well designed, 
but even so is imperfect, so perfectly following the procedure does not 
 21. Norman Daniels, Merit and Meritocracy, PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 206 (1978); Judith 
Jarvis Thomson, Preferential Hiring, PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 364 (1973) (describing and 
rejecting the idea that private employers have a duty to hire the most qualified in this 
sense). 
 22. Of course, these indeterminate formulations leave lots of room for 
disagreement as to what, in any given case, really does constitute being best qualified. 
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guarantee selection of the best applicant; or (c) the procedure is well 
designed, but not correctly followed in this instance, and so on. 
Given this clarification, the right of the best qualified applicant for 
selection might be understood as the right of the person who is really, 
from a God’s eye perspective, best qualified.  The right might also be 
understood in a more down-to-earth sense, for example, as the right to 
have one’s application processed by a reasonable procedure and to be 
selected if that procedure, correctly followed, would single out one’s 
application as top ranked.  The down-to-earth specifications of “best 
qualified” slide closer to a purely procedural understanding amounting 
to the right to a fair process.  Here, the right is considered in its ideal 
sense and in a proceduralist interpretation after that. 
On this view, what is morally wrong about wrongful discrimination is 
that it tends to produce the result that the meritocratic right of the best 
qualified to be selected is violated. 
The difficulty in this approach is that the idea that there is any such 
moral meritocratic right is on its face not plausible.  Consider whimsical 
hiring.  I am hiring persons to work in a doughnut shop I own.  There are 
several other doughnut shops in the neighborhood, so it will not be a 
great loss to any actual or potential customer if my doughnut shop is not 
run as well as it might be.  I announce that I will respond to the applications 
according to my subjective mood and select an applicant to be hired by 
arbitrary whim.  This does not seem to be in the ballpark of wrongful 
discrimination.  Nor is it plausible that my whimsically hiring Fred to man 
the cash register violates the right of other, better qualified applicants to 
man cash registers instead. 
In many hiring cases, whimsical hiring would violate fiduciary 
obligations to firm shareholders.  The manager of the firm is contractually 
obligated to the shareholders to run the firm in a way that is profit-
maximizing, and whimsical hiring fails this test.  However, one can 
contract out of such duties.  For example, hiring Arneson as manager, it 
is agreed in advance among all concerned parties that Arneson is bent on 
whimsical hiring.  A similar point holds respecting obligations a business 
enterprise might be thought to have toward potential customers.  Again, 
explicit announcements of one’s intentions would suffice to eliminate 
any such obligations.  But, then it seems that in cases where such obligations 
are in force, it is explicit or implicit contracting—voluntary deals one 
makes when one could instead have made a deal on different terms—
that is the source of any obligation to engage in meritocratic hiring that 
might plausibly be thought to exist.  If there is a violated right, it is the 
right that contracts be fulfilled if one has done one’s contractually 
specified part.  This has nothing per se to do with wrongful discrimination. 
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If there is no right for hiring selections in the order of the comparative 
merit, wrongful discrimination cannot be analyzed in these terms.  What 
goes for hiring holds also for distributing bank loans and filling student 
slots in universities. 
Turn now to the idea that the right that wrongful discrimination 
violates is the right, operative in certain familiar contexts, to submit an 
application and to have one’s application considered according to some 
process reasonably related to the goals that are supposed to be furthered 
by the posts for which applications have been solicited.  To be fair, the 
process need not be perfect and need not be perfectly followed.  
Imperfect procedures and mistakes in the administration of the process 
can be morally innocent, not wrong at all.  But one’s fair process right is 
violated if one is excluded from consideration or not given consideration 
comparable to other applicants on grounds that have no reasonable 
relation to the underlying goals the process supposedly serves. 
The objection to the idea that one has a basic moral right that one’s 
applications be given due process is a diluted version of my objection to 
the supposed right of the best qualified to be selected.  Against the latter, 
whimsical selection can be morally permissible on any reasonable 
deontological view and against the former whimsical application 
processing can equally well be morally permissible. 
Return to the doughnut shop example.  Advertising for job applicants, 
I announce that there is no implicit promise, in soliciting applications, to 
give any application any sort of consideration.  I reserve the right to 
exclude batches of applications on arbitrary and subjective grounds and 
to short-circuit any application handling process by simply picking a 
random application and offering that applicant the job.  Alternatively, I 
might single out a whimsical process for selecting applicants and follow 
that process rigorously, awarding the job to the candidate singled out by 
that procedure.  Such an irritating announcement might reduce the 
volume of applications received, but the announcement itself does not 
plausibly violate any potential applicant’s standing right to due process. 
Another possibility is that wrongful discrimination is discrimination 
that disfavors persons of a certain type in a way that expresses hostile or 
otherwise morally inappropriate attitudes toward persons of that type.  
Whimsical hiring does not express these morally untoward negative 
attitudes toward any group of people, and will not qualify as wrongful 
discrimination on this account. 




Arguably, this proposal satisfies the Thomson constraints.  An agent’s 
acts can express an attitude whether or not the agent actually has the 
attitude in question.  For example, one can deliberately express an attitude 
one does not hold.  That is, one can express an attitude inadvertently, 
without oneself holding the expressed attitude.  Perhaps it is better to say 
that one is behaving as though expressing the attitude that the reasonable 
observer of one’s behavior will come to believe that one is expressing. 
Given the above, one might propose that wrongful discrimination is 
discrimination that reasonable observers of the discriminating behavior 
will interpret as conveying hostile or other morally inappropriate 
attitudes toward the object of the discrimination.23  But suppose that if I 
raise the Confederate flag over my doorstep, many of my neighbors will 
unreasonably but innocently misinterpret my act and take me to be 
expressing hostility to my non-white, non-Asian neighbors.  This is not a 
reasonable interpretation of my conduct, because all concerned parties 
know of my adulation of historical tidbits.24  Still, many people will 
suffer seriously wounded feelings from their sense that I am expressing 
inappropriate attitudes.  One might hold that in these circumstances my 
act is wrongful discrimination, independently of my intention in doing it, 
my motivation, and the possible culpability I accrue from doing it.25  In 
the same spirit, one might assert that if one’s discriminatory behavior 
would be interpreted by reasonable but culpably misinformed observers 
as expressive of morally inappropriate attitudes, that set of facts would 
not render it wrongful.26
However, what makes discrimination wrongful (when it is wrongful) 
is a thick description matter and not a matter that shows up adequately in 
an act thinly described.  In the absence of strong reasons to accept 
Thomson’s claims of the Irrelevance-of-Intention-(and Motivation)-and-
Fault-to-Moral-Permissibility, no strong reasons exist to accept them as 
a constraint on the characterization of wrongful discrimination. 
 23. For discussion of related issues, see Mathias Risse & Richard Zeckhauser, 
Racial Profiling, 32 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 131 (2004). 
 24. For example, shards of ancient Egyptian pots and an inedible Soviet-era wilted 
beet are displayed from my living room window. 
 25. One should not respond to this example by going to the other extreme by 
stipulating that one’s behavior constitutes wrongful discrimination if it is interpreted by 
the actual observers of the behavior as expressive of morally inappropriate attitudes.  
This stipulation would yield the result that if one’s impeccable behavior would be 
interpreted by people with culpably overwrought sensibilities as expressing bad attitudes, 
the behavior might then, if discriminatory, qualify as wrongful discrimination. 
 26. I have no serious objection to this proposal.  It seems excessively indirect and 
roundabout, but that may be merely an aesthetic judgment. 
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IV. DISCRIMINATION FROM ANIMUS AND PREJUDICE 
After a long detour, this takes us back to the idea that wrongful 
discrimination occurs only when an agent treats a person identified as 
being of a certain type differently than she otherwise would have done 
from unwarranted animus or prejudice against persons of that type.  
Animus is hostility or, more broadly, a negative attitude, an aversion.  
One might suppose that to be defined as “animus,” the negative attitude 
must rise to a threshold of negativity.  The slightest whisker of aversion 
to a group might be unwarranted but hardly seems seriously morally 
wrong.  For an example of a permissibly slight level of aversion, suppose 
that in a society composed of people from different ethnic backgrounds, 
each individual prefers to live in a neighborhood in which no more than 
ninety-five percent of the residents are members of ethnic groups other 
than her own.  On the other hand, a large negative reaction in one’s 
behavior toward a member of some group that is motivated by very 
slight aversion can be culpable.27  Perhaps to count as “wrongful,” the 
discrimination must proceed from aversion that is, considered in tandem 
with the motivating character, above some threshold of culpability. 
Although in the current cultural climate there is considerable support 
for the idea that one must respond to each individual with whom one 
interacts as a unique individual, on the basis of a good faith effort to 
determine that individual’s particular qualities relevant to one’s potential 
interaction with the person, this idea is hopeless.  There is nothing 
morally untoward about responding to individuals on the basis of 
statistical indicators their broad characteristics suggest.  Being a member 
of the class of people who are physically uncoordinated may be a 
relevant consideration if you are deciding on a cleanup hitter on a 
sandlot baseball team, and being an alcoholic may be all one needs to 
know to decide an applicant is not suited to be chosen as corporate CEO.  
After all, one is always interested not in how an individual will behave 
in general, but in how the individual will behave on specific occasions 
when her performance affects other individuals or a favored enterprise’s 
success.  The fact that an individual is prone to absenteeism is only a 
statistical indicator of the feature one really cares about when deciding 
whether to select that individual for a job. 
 27. This might be a case of morally tainted whimsicality. 




So if prejudice is not to be equated with relying on stereotypes, what 
is it?28  One wrongfully discriminates against a person of a certain type 
from prejudice when one treats the person differently than one otherwise 
would have done on the basis of beliefs about the person’s 
characteristics that are either inferred from one’s beliefs about persons of 
that type or directly caused by one’s reaction to the type, these beliefs 
being formed in some culpably defective way. 
The beliefs about a person formed defectively on the basis of beliefs 
about that person’s group need not be negative beliefs.  In the pre-Civil 
War United States, within abolitionist thought one finds a strain of 
romantic racialism that ascribes fancifully noble qualities to enslaved 
African-Americans.29  If the romantic racialist abolitionists formed these 
beliefs via some culpably defective process, discrimination on the basis 
of these beliefs would constitute wrongful discrimination. 
On this account, whether one is acting from prejudice does not depend 
on whether one’s beliefs happen to be true.  If one forms beliefs about 
most people on the basis of generally reliable and epistemically 
nondefective rules and procedures, but then drops these standards when 
one forms beliefs about African-Americans and simply assumes African-
Americans must be bad (or good), the beliefs are prejudiced by virtue 
of their faulty origin.  This is true even when one’s normally reliable 
procedures lead to massively false beliefs about most people, and following 
one’s defective procedures respecting African-Americans happens to 
lead to correct beliefs about African-Americans. 
Whether the process by which one forms beliefs is defective to the 
point of culpability hinges on varying standards depending on what is at 
stake.  If I hand out trivial good conduct badges in a Cub Scout troop, 
and nothing of consequence hinges on making correct assignments, it is 
acceptable to invest less energy seeking out, assessing, and integrating 
evidence regarding who deserves a badge than if I am handing out scarce 
lifesaving medical treatments according to the comparative benefit that 
potential recipients would gain. 
One’s culpability with respect to the epistemic quality of the process 
by which one forms beliefs about people with whom one might interact 
or whose lives one’s behavior might affect might have its source in 
morally inappropriate attitudes and desires concerning those people.  
Alternatively, it might have its source in purely epistemic faults.  I might 
have an unwarranted aversion to Korean-Americans, and my aversion 
 28. By stereotypes, I mean beliefs about an individual’s characteristics by 
inference from the characteristics statistically associated with groups of which the 
individual is a member. 
 29. For example, HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, UNCLE TOM’S CABIN (1852) displays 
romantic racialist beliefs. 
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might cause me to form beliefs about Korean-Americans that are biased 
downward.  This aversion taints my belief formation process as culpably 
faulty.  In another type of case, I simply am lazy in forming beliefs.  I 
harbor no animus against Korean-Americans, but I discriminate against 
them on the basis of negative beliefs about the characteristics of Korean-
Americans that I lazily absorb from the prevailing culture.  I do not subject 
these beliefs to the critical scrutiny that is epistemically warranted due to 
the general unreliability of popular beliefs.  In this case I am culpably at 
fault for forming my beliefs about this group in this way, even though no 
animus against the group plays a role in the process. 
On the proposed view, one might be wrongfully discriminating against 
certain types of people if one treats them differently than one would 
have done if one had not had prejudiced beliefs about those people, the 
beliefs counting as prejudiced because of their culpably defective 
origination.  This is true even if one forms beliefs in exactly the same 
culpably defective way across the board, regardless of whether the 
people in question are Jews, WASPS, African-Americans, or whatever.  
One is still treating these people differently than one would have done if 
one did not have the prejudiced beliefs concerning them.  Perhaps the 
account should be amended so that defective belief acquisition processes 
ground the complaint of prejudice only when the processes vary in 
defectiveness depending on the type of person about whom beliefs are 
being formed. 
V. AN OBJECTION 
Imagine that one has no animus against African-Americans and holds 
no prejudiced beliefs about them.  One lives in a Jim Crow society with 
a fixed racial caste hierarchy.  Social norms dictate that African-
Americans are to be hired only for menial jobs.  One perceives that one 
will gain advantages for oneself if one follows the norm and refuses to 
hire highly qualified African-Americans for skilled jobs.  We may 
suppose the norm is not enforced so rigidly that the noncompliance 
penalties would be severe.  One could probably flout the norm with 
relative impunity.  One also sees that one can gain special advantages 
from willingly complying with the Jim Crow norm.  One sells a product, 
and seeing one’s conformity, customers will become more fiercely loyal 
to that product and profits will increase.  Apparently, my proposal 
counts this as not a case of wrongful discrimination, which on the face of 
it looks absurd. 




However, what is described here is a secondary phenomenon with 
respect to the idea of wrongful discrimination.  Many people in the Jim 
Crow society are motivated by animus and prejudice, and the individual 
we are imagining reaps benefits for himself by catering his behavior to 
them.  One acts wrongly because one fails to act against this massive 
wrongful discrimination practice, and in so doing one contributes to the 
maintenance of a vicious caste hierarchy. 
Another objection arises once we amend the example.  Imagine that 
nobody harbors racial animus or prejudice.  The Jim Crow norm arises 
and lasts via the strategic recognition on the part of the cooperators who 
initiate and sustain this norm that acting in this way will be beneficial to 
them.  Each gains by acting as though he were a wrongful discriminator.  
On my account, none is a wrongful discriminator.  Yet, something still 
smells fishy. 
This analysis emits no bad odor that I can detect.  I am happy with this 
description of the heinous situation: all the Jim Crow cooperators are 
acting as though they were wrongful discriminators and are doing so in a 
manner that unfairly harms people.30
VI. INNOCENT DISCRIMINATION 
An attractive feature of the animus and prejudice account of what 
makes discrimination intrinsically morally wrong is that it facilitates 
acceptance of the notion that innocent forms of discrimination exist that 
involve the classificatory categories such as race that have been 
previously thought inherently wrongful as bases of discrimination.  For 
example, there can be morally innocent instances of racial discrimination.  
These are simply the ones that are not driven by animus or prejudice. 
Reiterating an already asserted claim, I am not merely claiming that 
some acts of racial discrimination are only slightly morally wrong or not 
sufficiently seriously morally wrong to be worth bothering about.  No 
doubt there are such trivially wrong discriminatory acts.  I claim that 
there is a further class of discriminatory acts the instances of which not 
morally wrong at all, rather, they are morally innocent.  They are neither 
mortal sins nor venial sins, either. 
Of course, acts that are not intrinsically morally wrong may become 
morally wrong for extrinsic reasons.  This is so when an act takes place 
 30. Here, the norm of unfairness that is being violated is a distributive justice 
norm, not the antidiscrimination norm.  The norm in question is that it is wrong to form a 
cartel to extract greater gain for cartel members than they could expect to gain on a 
competitive market.  This behavior is exploitive as judged by the standard of a 
competitive market.  See John Roemer, Exploitation, Alternatives, and Socialism, 92 
ECONOMIC J. 87 (1982) (characterizing several conceptions of exploitation). 
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in circumstances where it causes bad consequences to an extent that 
outweighs its intrinsic innocence. 
Consider discriminating between my family and friends and those 
outside this circle when I decide who should be the recipients of gifts.  If 
I give a bicycle to my niece rather than to a stranger, my selection need 
not involve any hostile attitude toward the stranger, no judgment that he 
is of lesser basic moral worth or lesser earned merit than my relative.  
Favoritism toward those near and dear to me is motivated by positive 
attitudes toward them, not negative attitudes towards any others.  Or it 
may be that I am simply conforming to conventional role expectations in 
favoring my narrow circle over those outside it, but again if these 
conventional role expectations themselves are established and sustained 
by social processes that do not involve prejudiced beliefs and hostile 
attitudes, my desire to conform to them is unlikely to be tainted by any 
such attitudes. 
A wide variety of deontological views will agree that within a broad 
range, and in certain social contexts, favoring my friends and relatives 
over other people exhibits morally permissible partiality.  Some might 
hold in addition that there are moral constraints dictating that partiality 
to friends and relatives is required to meet minimal commitments of 
the relationships.  But consider just options, the moral freedom that 
deontological moralities assign to each of us to live as we choose within 
broad limits of constraints formed by other people’s rights.  In a wide 
variety of contexts, favoring family and friends over non-kin and non-
friends is accepted, morally permissible discrimination.31
But the same moral freedom can be in play when individuals discriminate 
among persons on the basis of classifications that are home ground for 
antidiscrimination norms.  Lesbians can favor lesbians without holding 
hostile attitudes or prejudiced beliefs toward heterosexuals.  Co-religionists 
can discriminate in favor of co-religionists in the same way, and for that 
matter atheists can exhibit morally permissible partiality to fellow 
atheists.  Some commentators characterize African-American partiality 
toward other African-Americans in a similar spirit.32  They describe an 
 31. For discussion of moral requirements and permissions to be partial to family 
members, friends, fellow countrymen, and those regarded as near and dear in various 
ways, see the essays in SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, BOUNDARIES AND ALLEGIANCES: PROBLEMS 
OF JUSTICE AND RESPONSIBILITY IN LIBERAL THOUGHT (2001). 
 32. Lionel K. McPherson & Tommie Shelby, Blackness and Blood: Interpreting 
African American Identity, 32 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 171, 189-92 (2004). 




attitude of racial solidarity that they suppose is common in the 
African-American community, and which is reasonable and morally 
unobjectionable.33  Identifying with fellow African-Americans, one is 
disposed to include within the favored group those who (a) have at least 
one traceable African ancestor; and (b) have detectable physical features 
associated with the “African-American” stereotype, features that render 
the possessor apt to be subject to mistreatment.34  Commentators 
somewhat nervously associate the racial partiality they are characterizing 
with a larger concern for social justice and special consideration for 
those who belong to groups that have been in the past and today still are 
denied just and fair treatment.35  But as noted, one who manifests racial 
partiality is not thereby exhibiting partiality toward all those who suffer 
injustice of whatever race or ethnic origin.36  Their speculation may be 
right that the association of being African-American and being subjected 
to vicious mistreatment is a partial cause of African-American racial 
solidarity.  But whatever its cause, racial partiality is racial partiality, not 
simply a solidarity with the oppressed.  On the view defended here, there 
is no deontological case for holding racial partiality to be intrinsically 
morally wrong when it does not proceed from animus or prejudice 
against those who are singled out for inferior treatment. 
The combination of (1) the deontological tolerance for partiality 
toward those who are near and dear; and (2) the fact that my analysis of 
wrongful discrimination does not restrict the classifications of persons 
engendering conceptions of the near and dear for purposes of determining 
the permissible partiality’s moral limits is strong medicine.  The direct 
implication is that partiality toward members of suspect classification 
groups can be the basis of legitimate partiality on the model of 
acceptable partiality to friends and kin.37  This view, if accepted, has 
serious moral implications. 
 33. Id. at 187-89. 
 34. McPherson and Shelby put the b point in different terms; they say that one who 
passes as white forfeits membership in the African-American community.  This formulation 
allows that one who satisfies condition a and fails to satisfy condition b but nonetheless 
identifies in a public way as an African-American thereby counts as one.  Id. at 184. 
 35. Id. at 188-89. 
 36. McPherson and Shelby consider the view of Kwame Anthony Appiah that if 
irrational and confused conceptions of race are set aside, “African Americans lack a 
rational or non-mythological basis for limiting their political solidarity to those who 
identify as, and are treated as, racially ‘black.’”  Their reply is that if people who share 
supposed racial characteristics such as skin color are victimized on that basis, partiality 
on the part of members of this group toward one another is at least morally permissible.  
Id. at 189.   
 37. For an attempt, unsuccessful in my judgment, to distinguish among 
classifications for purposes of deciding the limits of permissible partiality, see Thomas 
Hurka, The Justification of National Partiality, in THE MORALITY OF NATIONALISM 139-
57 (Robert McKim & Jeff McMahan eds., 1997). 
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Consider that partiality to those near and dear to us can play 
significant roles in public policy and in governmental action.  Consider 
the familiar view that it is acceptable for the policies of our military to 
sharply distinguish deaths of American combatants and American 
noncombatants from deaths of combatants and noncombatants of other 
nations.  The same goes for the military forces of any other country.  
This is discrimination on the basis of citizenship, not ruled out by my 
account of wrongful discrimination. 
VII. DISPARATE IMPACT 
Suppose that an action or policy, otherwise justifiable, has a disparate 
impact on a group of people.  Its results include imposing a disadvantage 
on some group—for example, women as opposed to men, whites as 
against Hispanics, or Danes by comparison with Swedes.  Suppose also 
that the action is not motivated by animus or prejudice against the 
disadvantaged group.  So, on the view this essay asserts, the action is not 
intrinsically morally wrong. 
These suppositions leave it open that the action in question brings 
about disadvantage as intended or as the unintended side effect of the 
pursuit of other goals.  Perhaps the Swedes are bombed because they are 
perpetrating an unjust war to which the bombing is a proportionate 
response.  Perhaps a drug is discovered and distributed that raises life 
expectancy when ingested by men but unfortunately does nothing when 
ingested by women. 
The classification that picks out the groups in question might or might 
not be a classification that shows up in the statement of fundamental 
moral principles.  Take the first alternative.  For example, fundamental 
principles might identify moral rights and specify retribution against 
blameworthy violators of these moral rights, and the italicized phrase 
singles out the group that the action disadvantages.  In this sort of case, 
if the action is justifiable, it will be mandated or permitted by fundamental 
moral principles. 
Alternatively, the classification that identifies the group in question 
might not appear in the statement of any fundamental moral principle.  
This will be so if the classification is one of those that figure in 
discussions of arbitrary discrimination: supposed race or lineage group, 
ethnicity, skin color, nationality, sex, sexual orientation, and the like.  
These sorts of features are morally inert.  That is why discrimination just 
on the basis of possession or non-possession of these features is morally 
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arbitrary and intrinsically wrong if motivated by animus or prejudice 
against these defined groups.  It simply does not matter morally whether 
one is white-skinned or brown-skinned or yellow-skinned. 
This has a further implication.  If an act is otherwise justifiable, in 
terms of (correct) fundamental moral principles, it does not matter 
morally that the act happens to result in advantage or disadvantage for 
people singled out in terms of some morally neutral classification 
scheme.  Any act will collect a myriad of such descriptions and is sure to 
result in favoring and disfavoring people classified in one arbitrary way 
or another.  My act may provide advantage to some people born before 
the year 2000 and not to those born after that date, or to some of those 
born in pink hospitals as opposed to hospitals painted some other color, 
and so on.  No matter, morally speaking. 
The result is that disparate impact per se is morally inconsequential.  If 
an act or policy is otherwise morally justifiable, the fact that its 
consequences favor or disfavor some group of people singled out by 
some morally arbitrary or neutral classification scheme is not alone a 
consideration that tends to render the act morally unjustifiable. 
The reader might protest that I am engaged in sleight of hand.  Have 
we not already agreed that when residential segregation occurs, and is 
explainable in the way Schelling described, the disparate impact of the 
segregation on African-American children warrants state action?  The 
disparate impact appears then nothing like a moral “don’t care.”  But 
what actually occurs is that costs fall on children and are not morally 
outweighed by gains to anyone else.  A variety of moral principles might 
equally well explain and justify the need for state action in such a case.  
Any plausible such principles should not mention race or skin color.  
The same state action would be called for if the affected children were 
green in color, or were a mixed lot including brown-skinned, white-
skinned, and yellow-skinned. 
Salient lines in social life that mark the morally arbitrary borderlines, 
such as those marking off race and ethnicity that have been wrongly 
treated as morally significant throughout recurrent, oppressive histories, 
have an odd, elusive standing in moral principles.  Racism and sexism 
are great evils, and so we expect that race and sex will loom large when 
formulating fundamental moral principles.  We expect that fundamental 
moral principles will prescribe equal treatment of groups singled out by 
these morally irrelevant classifications, but since the classifications are 
really morally irrelevant, this turns out not to be so.  To vindicate this 
hunch would require an articulation and defense of the fundamental 
moral principles, a task that lies beyond the scope of this essay. 
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Disparate impact might offend against a substantive principle of equal 
opportunity such as John Rawls’s fair equality of opportunity principle.38  
This principle requires that all those with the same ambition and the 
same native endowment of talent (or prototalent) should have the same 
prospects for competitive success.39  If otherwise unobjectionable 
actions and policies bring it about that fair equality of opportunity is not 
satisfied, these policies will be regarded as wrong if the fair equality of 
opportunity principle is assigned moral priority over the principles that 
justify these policies.  However, fair equality of opportunity is objectionably 
meritocratic and should be rejected on that ground; yet, this issue is 
complex.40  Fair equality of opportunity can be satisfied, or fail to be 
satisfied, whether or not wrongful discrimination occurs. 
VIII.  SUSPECT CLASSIFICATIONS 
Discrimination that is intrinsically morally wrong is responsiveness 
of the wrong sort to certain classifications of persons.  We say that 
discrimination on the basis of race, creed, or color is wrong.  The paradigm 
classification that features in wrongful discrimination is race or, perhaps 
even better, skin color and similar superficial racial characteristics.  
Treating African-Americans worse because they are African-Americans 
encapsulates a long history of United States racial caste hierarchy from 
slavery to Jim Crow and beyond.  Persecuting people on the ground that 
they adhere to a socially disfavored religion is another paradigm source 
of wrongful discrimination, and the long history of Jewish persecution 
by Christians and others combines elements of racial and religious 
discrimination. 
However, it is tough to say what renders certain classifications 
problematic or especially apt for running afoul of a correct antidiscrimination 
norm.  This becomes clear when we extend the list of classification 
types past supposed race and skin color.  Prominent candidates include 
ethnicity, sex, religion, age, disability status, and sexual orientation.  The 
common thread, if any, is not so easy to discern. 
 38. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 57-101 (rev. ed. 1999). 
 39. Id. at 63. 
 40. Compare Richard J. Arneson, Against Rawlsian Equality of Opportunity, 93 
PHIL. STUD. 77 (1999) (arguing against the fair equality of opportunity principle), with 
Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Race, Labor, and the Fair Equality of Opportunity Principle, 
72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1643 (2004) (defending fair equality of opportunity). 




Perhaps this issue does not have to be faced.  The proposed characterization 
of wrongful discrimination identifies it with discrimination on the basis 
of unwarranted animus or prejudice against persons of that type.  If one 
discriminates against dishonest persons on the basis of warranted 
negative attitude toward those people or on the basis of accurate beliefs 
about the associated traits of those persons relevant to decisions as to 
how to deal with them, no wrongful discrimination occurs.  If you 
discriminate against persons with large earlobes on the basis of 
unwarranted animus or prejudice, this is wrongful discrimination, even if 
there is no history of wrongful treatment on this basis and no likelihood 
that you are setting a trend. 
This solution is fine as far as it goes, but it should heighten the 
reader’s sense that clarifying the idea of wrongful discrimination is not 
going to do much heavy lifting for the task of determining what social 
justice requires with respect to policies for dealing with suspect 
classifications.  To switch the metaphor, the idea of wrongful discrimination 
is not going to provide the whole carpet, nor show the pattern in the 
carpet.  This idea, the subject matter of this essay, is just a thread.  
However, the larger question lingers: What constitutes fair treatment of 
people across the suspect classifications of race, skin color, ethnicity, 
religious creed, and sex and across the arguably suspect classifications of 
age, sexual orientation, disability status, and perhaps gender orientation?41  
The categories are surely important, even if analyzing the nature of 
wrongful discrimination does not illuminate the categories. 
A bit of reflection suffices to strengthen the lesson that these various 
suspect classifications pose radically separate and distinct questions of 
justice that require remedies specifically attuned to each type of 
classification’s particular set of issues.  Suppose that the role and 
significance of a properly formulated antidiscrimination norm differs as 
one moves from classification to classification.  What results is that the 
antidiscrimination norm does not help in formulating policies which 
adequately respond to the motley of issues we face. 
 41. By “gender orientation” I mean the orientation of one’s will toward acquiring 
either conventionally “masculine” or “feminine” traits or some mix of one’s devising.  
Some men might strive to be masculine, some to be feminine; likewise some women 
might strive to be masculine, others to be feminine.  Some of either sex might strive to 
be hypermasculine or hyperfeminine; others might studiously cultivate gender 
androgyny or some balanced mix.  People who are not biologically fully male or female 
might also vary along this range of gender orientations.  The possibility then arises that 
some might wrongfully discriminate against others on the basis of animus or prejudice 
against persons of a particular gender orientation. 
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A.  Age 
Consider age and age discrimination, and in particular, discrimination 
against old people.42  Our contemporary world is one in which life 
expectancy is increasing and also a world in which efficiency wages are 
common in many sectors of the economy.43  The latter fact means that 
many people are occupying jobs that someone else would be willing to 
do equally well for significantly less compensation.44  Otherwise stated, 
occupants of these jobs would be significantly worse off in their next-
best employment.  These jobs tend to be good and excellent jobs, and 
their occupants are a privileged group compared to holders of jobs for 
which markets clear at equilibrium.45  Now add another stylized fact of 
the world we inhabit: The effects of advancing age include serious 
declines in mental acuity and in the physical vitality that enables sustained 
concentrated work effort.  These effects vary enormously in pacing and 
magnitude from person to person, but the trends are inevitable and not 
everyone can be an exception to the general trend.  Moreover, in many 
settings, individualized competency determinations for individuals with 
long tenure in their jobs would be messy, costly to administer, subject to 
error, and in many cases would impose psychic wounds on those 
negatively assessed.  In the world of these stylized facts, here is a 
pressing issue of fairness in distributing good and excellent jobs across 
people who belong to different age cohorts: Old people who occupy 
such jobs are among the better off members of society, and a wide range 
of plausible distributive justice norms would require transfer of benefit 
from them to worse off groups. 
 42. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE (1995). 
 43. See EFFICIENCY WAGE MODELS OF THE LABOR MARKET (George A. Akerlof & 
Janet L. Yellen eds., 1986); see also STIGLITZ, INFORMATION AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
(1993); J. E. Stiglitz, The Causes and Consequences of the Dependence of Quality on 
Price, 25 J. OF ECONOMIC LIT. 1 (1987). 
 44. See George Akerlof & Janet L. Yellen, Introduction to EFFICIENCY WAGE 
MODELS OF THE LABOR MARKET 9 (George Akerlof & Janet L. Yellen, eds. 2001). 
 45. If wages above the market-clearing rate are paid to reduce turnover costs, this 
factor will not be in play for jobs that are entirely unskilled and require no training.  If 
wages above the market-clearing rate are paid to reduce shirking when shirking is hard 
but not impossible to detect, this factor will tend to be in play for jobs for which close 
supervision is unfeasible and output hard to measure.  If wages above the market-
clearing rate are paid to attract higher ability applicants when ability is better known by 
the applicant than by the employer, again this factor will be more in play when ability 
will strongly affect productivity.  All of these factors are associated, not necessarily but 
contingently, with good jobs not dead-end jobs.  See generally id. at 9-10. 




In this setting it may well be fair, for example, to impose mandatory 
retirement at a specified age for surgeons, to favor younger applicants 
for posts as surgeons, to favor choice of aged surgeons for layoffs when 
economic conditions necessitate contraction of employment, and to have 
generic employment contracts that automatically provide demotion for 
aged surgeons (so they give up the knife and move into family practice 
at lower pay and prerequisites). 
These policies might be implemented by economic contracting, or 
legally mandated, or legally encouraged by noncoercive state action.  
Social norms might also play a useful role.  In all cases, I am envisaging 
policies that classify people by age and treat people at different ages 
differently according to correct determinations of the classified group’s 
characteristics.  In other words, as a member of the group, I am treated 
according to reasonable, accurate stereotypes.  Such policies would not 
run afoul of the antidiscrimination norm, but that does not settle the 
question of their fairness and moral appropriateness.  All the action 
occurs at the level where we ask what classifications that divide people 
into groups should be the coarse-grained basis for determining how they 
ought to be treated. 
Policies that subject old people to rough just treatment in the labor 
market should not be intended to drive old people from productive 
employment, at least not at too early an age.  With rising life expectancy 
and advancing medical technology, the prospect opens that I might stay 
at my job, blocking a more qualified and worse off younger person, until 
a very advanced age.  I could then retire at age eighty and become a 
basin of attraction for scarce medical resources, keeping me barely alive 
to age one hundred, when the resources could have been instead used to 
improve the chances of afflicted young people to live a decent quality of 
life through a reasonable life span.  The scenario just depicted is not fair.  
But it would not be a good idea to drive old people from high-wage 
employment into an early retirement at age fifty, thus prolonging the 
number of years when we would be living from the labor of others worse 
off according to a lifetime measure.  A better idea is to promote the shift 
of the old to less demanding lower-wage work when that is efficient and 
fair, and also to ration the allocation of expensive medical treatments in 
ways that are age sensitive (so if curing my cancer at a cost of a million 
dollars would yield one QUALY46 and curing your cancer at the same 
 46. QUALY: Quality-Adjusted Life Years.  I favor weighting QUALYS by 
priority to the lifetime worse off in medical allocation decisions.  On the stark conflict 
between what might naively seem to be fair medical rationing schemes and the 
requirements of some conceptions of antidiscrimination norms, see Dan W. Brock, 
Health Care Resource Prioritization and Discrimination Against Persons with 
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cost would yield two QUALYS, you stand in front of me in the queue 
waiting for a fair allocation of medical treatment). 
These cursory remarks are not intended even as toy model social 
policy analysis.  Social policy analysis requires registration of empirical 
facts at a level of thoroughness beyond the scope of this essay.  So, if 
your response is to think that old people merit different treatment than 
described, your response does not conflict with the point on which I 
mean to insist.  Your disagreement should be couched in terms of 
proposed policies that divide people into groups according to age and 
determine how people should be treated in part according to their group 
status.  Justice requires treating people according to reasonable, accurate 
stereotypes, the degree of coarse-grainedness supported by a morally 
sensitive cost-benefit analysis. 
B.  Sex 
To illustrate the same points from another angle, consider sex, another 
suspect classification.  The broad issue is how to achieve fairness in the 
treatment of people who are biologically male or female (with some 
intermediate cases) given the significant differences, on the whole and 
on the average, between the groups.  The nature and extent of the 
differences (that either cannot or should not be eliminated by sensible 
and feasible social policy) are not presently known, but they are likely to 
be significant.  For one example, women on the whole and on the 
average are physically less strong than men, so achieving a high level of 
enforcement of the moral right not to be physically attacked, not to be 
subject to extortion by threat of physical attack, not to be placed in 
reasonable apprehension of physical attack and so on, is extremely 
important for securing real freedom for women at the level that justice 
demands.  For another example, suppose that over time women will more 
often assume primary responsibility for childrearing.47  Assume also that 
women’s labor force participation and engagement in entrepreneurial self-
employment increase, and women have the same profile of career 
aspirations that men do.  The question then becomes how to arrange the 
economic marketplace alongside childrearing so that men and women 
Disabilities, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES 223 (Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita 
Silvers eds., 2000). 
 47. See VICTOR R. FUCHS, WOMEN’S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY 68, 140-41 
(1988). 
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participate in the marketplace on a relatively level playing field.  In the 
end, to state a banal truth, we want both men and women to lead lives of 
fairly distributed high quality and children to be well raised. 
My sense is that we are only in the beginning stages of devising laws, 
policies, institutional arrangements, and social norms that will secure 
egalitarian justice in a world of difference.  Presently, we do not know 
what the appropriate norms of sexual regulation are in a world where 
mainly heterosexual men and women work together as colleagues, 
teammates, and competitors on an equal footing in the workplace.  We 
do not know where on the line between enforced prudery and hanky-
panky tolerance at work the morally correct policy lies, or even if it lies 
in different places for different work contexts.  If the interests of men 
and women differ in stable ways, the issue is how to arrange fair levels 
of satisfaction of these clustered interests.  Nor do we know what social 
policies and norms will best facilitate fair terms of cooperation in the 
interactions of men and women over issues of work, career, and 
childrearing. 
It is often correctly noted that women seeking to rise in careers are 
often unfairly treated by stereotyped assumptions that figure in 
manager’s minds when deciding who shall be promoted or hired to fill a 
choice post.  If the manager assumes the woman will rear children 
shortly and therefore hiring her for the responsible post would be 
ineffective, the woman applicant who either will not have children or 
can juggle demanding responsibilities is penalized by lying on the tail 
end of the curve of relevant expectable behavior.  Foreseeing this 
scenario, women who should be leading the pack are not provided with 
proper incentives to develop their human capital so they can compete for 
top slots.  The effects on women’s choices reverberate.  This is all true, 
but one should also note another type of unfairness.  Suppose in their 
early twenties men and women enter a highly competitive profession and 
must endure years of low pay and demanding work that is compensated 
to a considerable extent by a tournament.  After competing in their 
twenties, in their thirties some small percentage of these young professionals 
will secure highly desirable positions.  These are the tournament winners.  
This could all be reasonably fair, except suppose that one-half of the 
women in their twenties will in fact veer onto a childbearing track in 
their thirties.  These women are then being compensated now in part 
with lottery tickets that will be of no use to them when it comes time for 
the tickets to be redeemed. 
I will not try to specify a fair arrangement for this scenario, but will 
note that the fair arrangement might well involve making employment 
offers to women not offered to men or even setting different legal 
standards for men and women.  Again, if such discrimination is well 
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motivated by fairness considerations it will not count as wrongful 
discrimination in my conception, but the wrongful discrimination idea 
itself does not settle what constitutes fair terms of cooperation between 
groups of people with different characteristics.  In a phrase not to be 
repeated, the idea of wrongful discrimination cuts little ice with respect 
to fair policy determination and may even be a red herring that cuts no 
ice. 
Another policy issue highlights the question of what constitutes 
fairness as between members of groups in a world of difference.  
Suppose in advanced democracies we see a trend toward imprudent, 
delinquent, and subpar behavior among male adolescents compared to 
women adolescents.  This trend gets reflected in a trend of higher ratios 
of young women than of young men becoming qualified for college 
admission and being admitted.  In the face of these hypothetical facts, 
should we institute affirmative action for young men and make sex-based 
adjustments to our norms of expected good conduct and academic 
achievement?  Should we simply allow men to internalize the social 
costs of their delinquency by letting the chips fall where they may?  
Should we channel educational resources to boys to help them meet the 
common standards of conduct and achievement we wish to impose on all 
adolescents (resources that of course have alternative uses that would 
advance social justice goals)?  These are not rhetorical questions and this 
essay is not the place to venture answers to them.  Whatever answers we 
give should register an awareness that although at the fundamental moral 
level our principles are individualistic,48 at a derived policy level, these 
norms will require treating people in coarse-grained ways on the basis of 
rough categories like being male or being female. 
C.  Sexual Orientation 
 Another example to ponder is sexual orientation.  Assume sexual 
orientation is either heterosexual or non-heterosexual.  Here it might 
seem that a nondiscrimination norm might do real work.  If people do 
not behave with animus or prejudice towards gays and lesbians, one 
might suppose the world is fair and just so far as the treatment of non-
heterosexuals goes.  However, an evangelical Christian might hold that 
homosexuality is devil’s work and should be stamped out from the 
world, yet adhere to a hate the sin, love the sinner mentality so that the 
 48. That is, nothing matters except what happens to individual persons. 




behavior he exhibits toward non-heterosexuals does not proceed from 
any animus or negative attitudes towards this classification.  Rather, he 
endorses efficient policies to save their souls.  The evangelical Christian 
promoter of what might be called an antigay political agenda also need 
not exhibit any false empirical beliefs about this group of people.  He 
differs from tolerant people only in regarding non-heterosexual sexual 
activity as always sinful, sin as bad, and helping people avoid sin an 
appropriate activity of a compassionate and fair government. The 
evangelical Christian might fully endorse the norm that one ought 
always refrain from wrongful discrimination.  According to me, he is 
wrong on the substantive moral issues regarding what sorts of sexual 
conduct are good, morally right to undertake, and worthy of state 
promotion. 
Again, here is a fairness issue that a just society must face even if 
everyone agrees that sexual pleasure and sexual friendship are equally 
good and worthy of promotion independently of whether they happen to 
occur in heterosexual or non-heterosexual sexual activity.  Suppose that 
in a sexually tolerant society, gay men are not significantly involved in 
the childrearing, on the whole and on the average.49  A question of fairness 
arises: How should the costs, benefits, joys, and sorrows of childrearing 
be fairly distributed across the individuals in society, hence across 
members of different groups?  We might hold that gay men are for 
purposes of this inquiry indistinguishable from heterosexual males who 
choose to be bachelors and not involve themselves in childrearing, but 
this is probably not correct.  A variety of causes might conspire to make 
it the case that non-heterosexual men have little chance of participating 
in childrearing whereas heterosexual single men have wide opportunities.  
What then?  We might imagine social policies, changes in the law, and 
attempts to influence the evolution of social norms that would target 
non-heterosexual men as a category for special treatment.  One might 
imagine tax law designed to require that non-heterosexual men 
contribute a fair share of the cost of educating children, a collective 
enterprise from which we all benefit and in which we all therefore have 
a stake. 
More fancifully one might imagine norm changes like the following: 
In the desirable future a family is conventionally defined as a heterosexual 
couple50 affiliated with a gay man or a gay couple.  The gay man or 
couple has a godparent role with respect to the children produced and 
 49. I set to the side the childrearing dispositions of lesbian women, which are 
presumably quite different and would require separate treatment. 
 50. Recall that I am just setting aside the issue of lesbians and family life, so I 
ignore the necessary qualifications to the formulation in the text. 
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raised in this “extended family.”  The gay godparent role involves sharing 
significant childrearing responsibilities and for contributing to the 
godchildren’s education costs.  The new practice is enforced by an accepted 
social norm.  No coercive penalties fall on you if you are an unaffiliated 
straight couple having children or if you are a gay couple not part of a 
wide family, but people will look at you strangely and regard your 
conduct as borderline inappropriate.  I do not make this suggestion as 
any sort of contribution to the moral theory of social norms.  I simply 
want to illustrate that treating people according to reasonable accurate 
stereotypes can be fair and morally proper all things considered. 
 
D.  Beauty and Ugliness 
This category may well be suspect though it is not often lumped with 
race, creed, color, sex, age, sexual orientation, and the other classifications 
thought to be the axes of wrongful discrimination.51  Suppose that in a 
wide range of contexts people tend to treat people that they perceive to 
be physically attractive—and believe most other people will also find 
physically attractive—better than those they perceive to be physically 
unattractive. 
It is not merely that when one seeks a movie star to be cast in a film, 
one seeks physical attractiveness.  In wide ranges of interactions, people 
prefer interactions with someone who looks like a stereotypical movie 
star than someone less attractive.  For most people in the undistinguished 
middle range of the physical attractiveness spectrum, this form of 
discrimination may not matter much, especially given the nonuniformity 
of different people’s ratings of attractiveness.  At the scale’s extremes, 
however, significant differences in life prospects result from being 
treated with deference if one is at the top of the scale and with disdain if 
one is at the bottom.  On my account, the treatment of ugly persons may 
often qualify as wrongful discrimination because the ugly person is 
being treated worse than he would be if he were not a member of a 
group that excites revulsion, and the revulsion may qualify as an 
unwarranted hostile attitude.  The attitude is not benign. 
The question then arises, what is an appropriate response to the 
problem that a social stigma attaches to extreme physical unattractiveness?  
 51. Michael Blake called my attention to the idea that discrimination on the basis 
of physical appearance is a morally serious issue. 




One proposal is that a decent society teaches people sound values that 
include rejection of the ideology of natural aristocracy52 and inculcation 
of a disposition to be attracted to people on a wide basis and perhaps 
even at the limit to see beauty in every human body.53  I have no 
objection to this proposal, though I have some doubts as to how far the 
project of changing people’s hearts and minds on this dimension can 
succeed.  We can surely train people to do more to inhibit their 
disdainful and offended responses in face-to-face interactions with those 
perceived as physically unattractive.  But an inhibited response is still a 
response, and likely communicates itself to its target, causing pain.  
However, the pleasure of responding to physical beauty seems per se 
innocent, and there is evidence that human biology constrains what one 
can experience as beautiful or ugly.  There is also the obvious point that 
some forms of social response that involve singling out extremely 
unattractive people for special treatment would reinforce that stigma and be 
counterproductive.  Perhaps a just society would include in its publicly 
funded health care coverage opportunities for cosmetic surgery and other 
corrective medical treatments for those meeting an unattractiveness 
threshold.54  If beauty is only skin deep, lack of beauty should be 
amenable to a technological fix.55
IX. DISCRIMINATION, DEONTOLOGY, AND CONSEQUENTIALISM 
The speculative examples in the previous paragraphs may attract the 
objection that the discussion has drifted from exploring the nature of 
wrongful discrimination within a deontological framework to consequentialist 
musings on what cost and benefit calculations would indicate about how 
to bring about best outcomes by any means necessary.  This objection is 
off the mark. 
A deontologist is someone who rejects consequentialism and instead 
holds that people (1) have options, moral permission to do many 
 52. That is, beautiful people are a higher species than the rest of us and they 
inherently deserve better treatment. 
 53. See Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality?, 109 ETHICS 287, 
335-36 (1999). 
 54. Such a scheme would not be self-defeating if the pain of qualifying for the 
procedure is amply offset by the gains that flow from the increased attractiveness the 
procedure delivers.  The pain of qualification could be reduced by reasonable privacy 
shrouding the qualification process. 
 55. In these remarks, I am assuming that what truly triggers a condition that merits 
a social response is not merely being less attractive than other members of the population 
but being less attractive when there is a considerable gap in absolute terms between 
one’s attractiveness level and the median and average attractiveness levels in the 
population.  If that were not so, successful aid to the worst off in this regard would just 
shift the burden of stigma to the next worst off. 
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innocent acts that would not bring about the best outcome that could be 
reached in their circumstances; and (2) are under constraints, moral 
prohibitions from doing certain types of acts even if those acts would 
bring about the best outcome that could be reached in their circumstances.56  
Adherence to (1) and (2) leaves it entirely open that one’s morality pays 
heed to consequences.  For starters, on any sensible nonconsequentialist 
morality, consequences will determine the line at which any given moral 
constraint gives way and ought to be infringed.  Moreover, a deontologist 
can and should hold that institutions and social practices ought to be set 
so that they operate over time effectively to bring about good 
consequences within the limits of moral constraints.57
X. THE ASSIMILATIONIST IDEAL 
In a justly famous essay exploring the nature of racism and sexism, 
Richard Wasserstrom contrasted different conceptions of an ideal society 
that had entirely transcended these evils.58  One conception he labels the 
“assimilationist ideal.”59  This would be a society in which people differ 
in superficial racial traits such as skin color and would differ in being 
male or female.  However, these traits would make no difference in 
anybody’s treatment of or responses to others.60  Racial and sexual traits 
would function just as eye color likely does in current society.61  People 
differ in eye color and the differences are noticeable but nobody pays 
any serious heed to these differences.  For all practical purposes, it 
makes little difference to anybody’s life or their interactions with other 
people that they are brown-eyed or blue-eyed.  One can extend Wasserstrom’s 
ideal so that it encompasses all suspect classifications, or whatever 
classifications are best regarded as suspect in the way that race and sex 
classifications are suspect. 
 56. See supra notes 5, 7. 
 57. John Rawls is a paradigm instance of a deontological theorist, but the ethics he 
proposes are sensitive to consequences of policy and action choices.  See RAWLS, supra 
note 38, at 26, where he writes, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take 
consequences into account in judging rightness.  One which did not would simply be 
irrational, crazy.” 
 58. Richard A. Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treatment: An 
Approach to the Topics, 24 UCLA L. REV. 581, 603-15 (1977). 
 59. Id. at 604. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 




One should qualify Wasserstrom’s characterization of the assimilationist 
ideal by introducing the idea of a bona fide qualification (BFQ) on 
analogy with the BFOQ of occupational discrimination law.62  Lacking 
suntan lotion and wanting a companion for a long trek in the hot sun, 
one would find dark skin color to be a BFQ, and treating people 
differentially in this way would be compatible with Wasserstrom’s 
assimilationist ideal.  In a similar way, wanting someone to carry on the 
labor of childbearing, one would choose a woman rather than a man; 
here, being a woman would be a BFQ.  Again, wanting a companion 
who will enjoy homosexual sex, one who picks a companion on the 
basis of sexual orientation does not violate the assimilationist ideal 
because in this context being homosexual is a BFQ.  This amendment to 
Wasserstrom is intended to be a friendly amendment, but does water 
down the ideal to a variable extent depending on how narrow or 
expansive one’s conception of what constitutes a BFQ for each suspect 
classification should be. 
The Wasserstrom assimilationist ideal is attractive.  My point in 
introducing it is simply to note that it is not plausibly construed as 
morally required according to any reasonable deontological morality.  
Whether the best versions of consequentialism would require adherence 
to Wasserstrom assimilation is a possibility I leave open.  Responding 
differently to people on the basis of their group classifications is not 
intrinsically immoral when it does not proceed from animus or 
prejudice.  Moreover, the permissible partiality toward those who are 
near and dear (according to a broad range of rights-based deontological 
views), if exercised, will result in a social world that does not satisfy the 
assimilationist ideal. 
Consider a decidedly noncosmopolitan world.  In this world people 
limit their interactions to fellow members of groups with which they 
identify.  Likes consort with likes according to similarity metrics that are 
perhaps quite arbitrary.  Immigration between nations is sharply restricted.  
The boundaries of nation states correspond to residential boundaries of 
nationalities, so that the people who happen to be citizens of a single 
state are united into a people bound together by common language, 
shared culture, and perhaps clan lineage.  Within these nationality groups, 
there is further subdivision into a wide variety of “us versus them” 
groupings.  Men club with men, and women with women.  Heterosexuals 
interact mainly with heterosexuals and non-heterosexuals with other 
non-heterosexuals.  The religious flock with those of like faith; the 
irreligious shun these churchy people and hang together.  Young people 
 62. The notion of a bona fide occupational qualification is explained in Alexander, 
supra note 13, at 204-08. 
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shun the old and the old return the favor.  In this world, the assimilationist 
ideal is flagrantly and massively unsatisfied.  However, nothing in this 
description entails that any wrongful discrimination is occurring, and 
indeed there might be none. 
We can further specify that the world is arranged so that these 
groupings and exclusions do not yield bad consequences rising to the 
level of violating anyone’s moral rights.  No moral duties are breached 
toward the targets of discrimination in the noncosmopolitan world.  How 
binding this constraint is depends on the best theory of social justice for 
a deontologist.  The constraint binds not at all for a Lockean libertarian 
and binds tightly for an egalitarian.63  However, even on a stringent egalitarian 
view of social justice demands, nothing precludes the noncosmopolitan 
world with non-wrongful discrimination from being arranged so that 
compensation is always provided to anyone who suffers unfair harm from 
the aggregate consequences of people choosing to consort with those they 
regard as “us” rather than “them” and thereby exhibiting morally permissible 
partiality toward those with whom they identify.  On a global scale, this 
would mean that while Norwegians and Danes might preclude immigration 
to their lands from people who are not Norse and Danish in culture and 
ancestry, these exclusions would bar no one on earth from enjoying a 
close to equal standard of living and life prospects (if equality of 
condition is mandatory) or are above the threshold that marks the good 
enough level of condition (if justice demands sufficiency). 
The noncosmopolitan world might be undesirable in various ways.  It 
would be condemnable on consequentialist grounds, if there are feasible 
alternative arrangements that would bring about more mixing of people, 
a better fit of complementary types in productive schemes of cooperation, 
and better outcomes for people according to the right standard for 
assessing outcomes.  Even a nonconsequentialist might regret the loss of 
the values that the noncosmopolitan world fails to deliver. 
Whether this is so and whether the Wasserstrom assimilation ideal sets 
a desirable social goal is a question in value theory and moral sociology.  
Once again, this result illustrates the main point of this essay: that the 
 63. On Lockean libertarianism, see generally NOZICK, supra note 5, at 235-38 
(arguing that the rights of a legitimate owner of a firm to hire at will trump the supposed 
rights of applicants to be hired on the basis of qualifications for the post and more 
generally that rights of ownership of property trump supposed rights to equal opportunity).  
On egalitarianism, see generally Richard Arneson, Egalitarianism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA 
PHIL., Aug. 16, 2002, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/egalitarianism. 
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antidiscrimination norm, properly conceived and calibrated with a proper 
understanding of wrongful discrimination, is less consequential for 
choice of action and social policy than those who care about liberating 
society from the social pathologies inherited from past caste hierarchies 
(and about preventing the rise of new invidious caste hierarchies) may 
suppose. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
